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ABSTRACT
 
Investment Requirements and the Participation of Korean and Taiwanese
 
Firms in Technology-Intensive Industries
 
The focus of the paper is the hypothesis that high investment costs
 
associated with technology-intensive activities preclude entry by relatively

small firms, leaving national Taiwanese firms at a disadvantage in

technology-intensive sectors 
relative to Korea. The paper explores the 
extent
 
to which the hypothesis helps account for the 
relative performance of Korea
 
and Taiwan 
in five product categories within the information industry. The
 
five products targeced in field research were the 
assembly of personal

computers (PCs); the manufacture of two peripherals for PCs, keyboards and
 
hard disk drives (HDDs); aad the fabrication of cwo components used in disk
drives, media and precision motors. The findings from the field research, and
 
thus the basis for the conclusion summarized below, are 
laid out in detail in
 
the paper.
 
For three of the five products 
-- the manufacture of media and precision
motors, and the assembly of HDDs 
-- the initial investment costs for entry at
efficient size were indeed quite substantial, and the character of the
 
production process afforded little opportunity for entry by firms unwilling

to meet these costs. 
Even so, there was no evidence that these investment
 
costs inhibited entry by Taiwanese 
firms. For the remaining two products-­
the manufacture of keyboards and of PCs 
-- there was substantial variation in
 
the size of firms at entry, with Taiwanese firms sulstantially smaller 
at
 
entry than their Korean counterparts; however, the smaller size of
 
Taiwanese 
firms at entry for these two products left them in no way

disadvantaged relative to 
the Korean companies.
 
For investments 
in potentially profitable technology- intensive acti.'ities
 
where up-front costs are in the $10 million to $20 million range, 
access to
 
finance 
does not represent a significant obstacle to entry on the part of
 
Taiwanese firms, 
 although Korea's giant conglomerates might enjoy an 
advantage over Taiwanese firrs in high-tech activities involving
substantially larger investments than 
were required for the products that
 
were the focus of the present research effort. The advantages of size are
 
not, however, ubiquitous. There 
is a whole range of technology-intensive

activities to 
 which the structure of Taiwanese industry, with its
 
preponderance of dynamic small firms appears to be exceedingly 
well adapted.
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Investment Requirements and the Participation of Korean and Taiwanese
 
Firms in Technology-Intensive Industries
 
by
 
Brian Levv and Wen-Jeng Kuo
 
This paper is one of two companion pieces I 
that report and interpret the
 
results of field interviews conducted in May and June 1987 with manufacturers 
in the information industry in Korea and Taiwan. The goal of the field research
 
was to explore the impacts of the very different industrial structures of the 
two countries 
on the prospects for succ3ssful promotion of the 
information and
 
other 
 frontier industries 
 in which technology- and innovation-intensive
 
activities play a major role.
 
In Korea, 'a small nwmber of conglomerate giants tower over the industrial 
landscape. In Taiwan, there is 
a proliferation of small and medium enterprises;
 
the largest industrial enterprises 
on that island occupy nothing like the
 
relative position 
of their Korean counterparts. 
In 1981, establishments with
 
500 or more workers accounted for 58 
percent of gross manufacturing output in
 
Korea, but only 47 percent in Taiwan. 2 Moreover, Korean factories tend to not 
be owned by ind~viduals, but disproportionately 
under the control of giant
 
conglomerates, the 
Chae'bol. The 
five largest Chae'bol accounted for 22.3
 
percent of the total 
value of 1983 shipments 
by the Korean manufacturing
 
The second piece, entitled "The Strategic Orientations of Firms and the

Performance 
 of Korea and Taiwan in 
 Frontier Industries: Lessons from
Comparative Case 
STudies of Keyboard and Personal Computer Assembly" explores
differences 
in the :-haracteristic strategies of Korean and Taiwanese firms 
in

technology-intensive industries
 
2 Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, 
Mining and Manufacturini
 
Survey_, 1981; and Republic of China, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting

and Statistics, The Report 
on Industrial and Commercial Census, 
Taiwan-Fukien
 
Area, 1981
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sector;3 the equivalent share 
for the five largest private Taiwanese groups-­
none of whom are anything like 
the size of their Korean counturparts-­
amounted to only 4.2 percent.4
 
The focus of the present paper is the hypothesis that high investment costs
 
associated with technology-intensive activities preclude 
entry by relatively
 
small firms, leaving national Taiwanese firms at a disadvantage in technology­
intensive sectors 
relative to Korea. Does the hypothesis help account for the
 
relative performance 
of Korea and Taiwan in the five product categories that
 
were the 
target of study? The paper reports on patterns of entry and subsequent
 
performance by seventeen Korean 
and Taiwanese manufacturers in the five
 
categories. As will be clear, the evidence leads us 
to reject the hypothesis.
 
Evidence from Five Products
 
There are plausible grounds for an a priori expectation that Korea's
 
industrial structure imparts to that country an 
advantage over Taiwan in
 
technology-intensive activities. The firms of
mastery by complex technology
 
takes both time and resources. Time for experiment, learning and adjustment
 
prior 
to the initiation of commercial production. And resources cover the
to 

costs of R&D and of any licensing that may be needed, the costs of investment
 
in plant and equipment, and the costs of the inevitable losses associated with
 
the start-up of commercial production; these last may include initially higb
 
3 For overviews of the role of the Chae-bol, 
see Lee (1986) and Jones
 
(1980). The estimate in the text is from Lee, p. 239.
 
4 In 1985, gross sales of the 
largest Korean conglomerate amounted to $13
billion, and of the largest Taiwanese group $1 billion. The estimate of 
-he
 
share of gross manufacturing output accounted for by the five largest Taiwan.,.se
 
groups is calculated from Top 500, 
China Credit Information Service, 1986 and

Republic of China, Ministry of 
Economic Affairs, Departmant of Statistics,

Report on Industrial. and Commercial Survey, Taiwan Area 1986.
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costrs as the firm learns-by-doing 
to improve productivity, excess 
capacity
 
(costly insofar as fixed
initial investments are large) prior to the firm
 
winning the confidence of initially sceptical buyers, 
and purposive discount
 
pricing as the firm endeavors 
to win market share from established producers.
 
It is plausible to hypothesize 
that the costs associated with technology­
intensive activities preclude entry by rel.tively small firms 
that (given only
 
moderately imperfect financial markets) likely lack
are to 
 access to the
 
financing needed for 
investment in activities involving long lead times, high
 
fixed costs 
and uncertain outcomes. The proposition follows 
-- and has been 
drawn by at least one researcher 5 
__ that the disproportionate role of smaller 
firms in Taiwan is likely to place that country at a disadvantage in
 
technology-intensive 
 activities relative 
 to Korea, where resources are
 
concentrated in the hands of a few, massive Chae'bol.
 
The five products targeted 
in our field research were the assembly of
 
personal computers (PCs); the manufacture of two peripherals for PCs, keyboards
 
and hard disk drives (HDDs); and the fabrication of two components used in disk
 
drives, media and precision motors. 
Table 1 breaks down the sample of firms
 
interviewed 
in the course 
of field research 
by country and product category.
 
There was some 
variation in the completeness of our coverage of firms 
in each
 
product category. Only one firm was engaged in the production of media, and one
 
in the manufacture of precision motors, in each 
country; so fur those two
 
categories our coverage was 
exhaustive. The four assemblers of HDDs 
that we
 
interviewed accounted for 
the overwhelming bulk of HDDs 
assembled in the two
 
5 See Mody (1985)
 
Table 1: A Disaggregation of the Field Sample by Product Category
 
Korea 
 Taiwan
 
Product
 
Keyboard 
 2 
 3
 
PC Assembly 
 2 
 2
 
HDD Assembly 2 
 2
 
Media Manufacture 1 1 
Precision Motor 1 1 
Manufacture
 
Total Number 
 89
 
of Firms
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countries.6 The two Korean keyboard interviewees represented the dominant, and
 
only other significant, suppliers of keyboards from that nation; 
the Taiwanese
 
keyboard firms comprised three of the seven leading exporters of keyboards from
 
that 
island. The four PC interviewees represent only sample from an
a small 

industry with 
a relatively large number of participants; moreover, the sample
 
is one that 
is (by intent) skewed towards leading PC suppliers in the two
 
7

countries.

As will be described below, 
for three of the five products 
- the 
manufacture of media and precision motors, and the assembly of HDDs -- the
 
initial investment costs for entry at efficient 
size were indeed quite
 
substantial, and the character of production process
the 
 afforded little
 
opportunity for entry by firms unwilling to meet these costs. 
 Even so, there
 
was no evidence that these investment costs inhibited entry by 
Taiwanese
 
firms. For the remaining two products -- the manufacture of keyboards and of 
PCs -- there was substantial variation in the size of firms at entry, with
 
Taiwanese firms substantially smaller at entry than their Korean counterparts.
 
However, as 
is noted below and is explored in detail in the companion paper,
 
the smaller size of Taiwanese firms 
at entry left them in no way disadvantaged
 
relative to the Korean companies.
 
6 Along with the four interviewees, two further Korean firms had made some
 
preliminary 
forays into HDD assembly. And four multinational firms had

expressed interest in establishing assembly subsidiaries 
(two in each country)

with varying levels of actual commitment.
 
7 The small size of the sample was unavoidable given our limited resources

and the necessity of making the comparison between Korea and Taiwan 
across a
 
nunber if product categories. We decided to focus leading firms part
on in
because we they provide better on
felt would a perspective the overall
 
structure of the industry than more minor players, and in part because 
-- giventhe importance in the present analysis of the role of strategy -- they offered
richer information as to the trajectories of expansion of significant players 
in the industry.
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Entry and performance with substantial investment costs. 
Table 2 summarizes
 
available estimates of the 
investment costs required for initiating production
 
in 
the three categories for which initial investment costs were substantial in
 
both countries: the 
estimates for media production ranged between $11 million
 
and $20 million; 
for HDD assembly, the most comprehensive esimate amounted to
 
$11 million; investment costs prior 
to the start-up of production of precision
 
motors was put at $5 million. These 
initial investment costs notwithstanding,
 
there was no evidence that Taiwan lagged behind Korea. On the contrary, for two
 
of the three categories the edge in performance lay with the Taiwanese firms.
 
To begin with media, 8 Taiwan's sole media company was begun 
in 1983 in
 
California, USA by a Chinese American (a member of 
a wealthy Chinese family
 
with long-standing roots in 
Taiwan) with extensive experience in the US
 
computer industry. Production in the company's Taiwan facility 
-- operated by 
the brother of the founder, a long-term Taiwanese resident 
-- began in 1986. At
 
the time of our interview, the company was 
producing at full capacity, 60,000
 
media per month, and 
was in the process of acquiring equipment to double
 
capacity to 120,000 media monthly 
within the following two months, with a
 
further doubling 
-- to 240,000 monthly 

-- scheduled for 1988.
 
Korea's sole media facility also 
was founded in 1983. However, its efforts
 
at conunercial production of media have thus 
 far proven less than wholly
 
successful: it 
was only in April 1987 that the company was able to conclude its
 
8 Me.ia is another 
name for the hard disks for storing information that
 
are sealed into hard disk drives 
for PCs. The production of media involves two
basic steps: the precision machining 
of an aluminum plate to a mirror-like

surface; 
and the coating of that plate with a-,.series of nickel, cobalt, chrome

and carbon compounds. The process is very technoogy-intensive, involving as 
it
does complex scientific skills embodied in chemical' 
 .­ineering and electronics

engineering, as well as high-precision mechanical engine
 
Table 2: 	Some Estimates of Initial Investment and Start-up Costsl/
 
for Three Technology-Intensive Products
 
Korea 	 Taiwan
 
Media $11 million $20 million 
HDD Assembly $ 4 million 2 /  $10 million 
Precision 3/ $ 5 million 
Motors
 
Sources: 	 Estimates provided by firms in the course of field 
interviews 
Notes : 1/ Firms were asked to include investment costs, costs
 
of R&D, and losses associated with start-up.
 
2/ Estimate excludes costs incurred in the course of initial
 
R&D and in the course of prior experience with assembly 
of floppy disk drives. 
3/ No estimate was provided by the Korean manufacturer
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first sales of media.9 Indeed, in 1986, when it had become apparent that the
 
commercialization of media was 
not yet at hand, the Korean firm entered into a
 
second line of business, HDD head assembly.1 0 
By mid-1987 head assembly was
 
bringing in $2 million monthly; prospects for 1988 and beyond were that head
 
assembly would account for 70 percent 
of the company's revenues, with the
 
manufacture of media now a secondary activity.
 
The Taiwanese lead in precision motors 
-- stepper and spindle motors for 
floppy disk drives I 
-- is at least as substantial. The only manufacturer for 
sale of these motors in Taiwan 
at the time of our interviews commenced
 
operations in July 1984 as a joint venture, with 60 percent of the equity in
 
the hands of a wealthy Taiwanese businessman, and 40 percent controlled by an
 
established Japanese manufacturer of precision motors. By early 1987 it was
 
operating at full capacity, producing 60,000 spindle and 45,000 stepper motors
 
each month. By the end of 1987 its 
capacity (and production) of spindle motors
 
will rise to 90,000 monthly; and in 1988 the company will commence 
production
 
9 The primary reason for 
the difference in performance between the Korean
 
and Taiwanese companies lay in their choice of 
 technology: whereas the
 
Taiwanese company concentrated its efforts on mastery of a 
conventional
 
technique of long standing for coating chemically the surface of the media (and

took over in 1984 an existing USA media company as a way of acquiring the
 
tchnology), the Korean firm attempted to --master with only minor consulting

services from Koreans employed in 
the industry in the USA -- an innovative 
process that, given mastery, held out the prospect of e higher quality, lower
 
cost product than could be manufactured via the conventional technique.
 
10 HDD head assembly is a straightforward, if precision, operation
 
(lower-tech than media manufacture) involving the winding under a microscope of
 
hair-thin wires 
that connect a ferrite head to an aluminum flexure.
 
11 No firms in either country had begun to manufacture motors for hard
 
disk dr.ves. Spindle motors 
rotate at rapid sped the floppy disks that contain
 
information; stepping motors glide 
the magnetic head that reads the information
 
rapidly back and forth above the surface of floppy
the disk. High levels of

precision en ;ineering are necessary to ensure 
that the motor maintains a stable
 
speed at very high temperatures, and to minimize motor vibration.
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of precision motors for video tape recorders. 
The Korean manufacturer that we interviewed -- a division of a company that 
is part of one of Korea's largest conglomerates 
--is also the/only manufacturer 
for sale of stepper and spindle motors in that country. Since 1983, 36 Korean 
engineers have been engaged full-time in the effort to develop stepper and 
spindle motors for floppy disk drives. 12 In 1985 the company began to gear up 
for mass production with lines capable of producing 10,000 units per month of 
each of the two motors. However, even in early 1987, production remained well
 
below capacity;13 the company expects to have these motors on the market
 
sometime in 1988.
 
The evidence as to which country has the edge in performance is somewhat
 
more ambiguous for the assembly of HDDs, an activity in which no 
firm in either
 
country has yet secured a strong market position. On the babiz of evidence
 
gathered in the course of our field interviews as to the cumulative value of
 
sales thus far, we conclude tentatively that a Korean firm appears marginally
 
ahead in the early running.
 
All four HDD firms interviewed had ready access to the requisite investment
 
finance. The two Korean operations both were attached to conglomerates, as was
 
12 According to our interviewees, at the time the company embarked on its
 
project no firms willing provide is
Japanese were to technical assistance.It 

not clear whether efforts were made to conclude a joint venture agreement of
 
the type negotiated by the Taiwanese firm.
 
13 Notwithst.anding its difficulties with motors for 
floppy disk drives,
 
the Korean company is moving ahead with efforts to develop (even higher

precision) stepper and spindle motors for HDDs, this time with 
the aid of
 
technical assistance agreement concluded in 
1986 with a US firm. The company
 
expects to have these motors on in 1988.
the market sometime Interviewees in
 
Taiwan averred that it would take until 1989 before they felt they would have
 
sufficient experience to master production of motors for HDDs.
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one of the Taiwanese; 14 the second Taiwanese HDD venture 
was an independent
 
firm established by the son of one 
of Taiwan's most powerful businessmen. Two
 
of the firms 
-- one Korean and one Taiwanese -- commenced their efforts in 
1982: in that year, the Korean firm assigned five engineers to work on the
 
design of floppy disk drives in the groups R&D facility; and the Taiwanese firm
 
set up a new R&D facility in Silicon Valley, California, charged with the
 
objective of developing an HIDD for commercial 
production. Efforts of the
 
remaining two firms commenced in 1986 -- in the form of a joint venture with a
 
USA company on 
the part of the Korean operation, and with the establishment of
 
clean-room facilities for HDD asSembly1 5 by its Taiwanese counterpart.
 
At the time of our interviews, none of the four firms producing at
were 

levels commensurate with their ambitions. Production by the two Taiwanese firms
 
amounted to 3-6,000 
and 5-8,000 HDDs per month; their respective capacities
 
were 
20,000 and 50,000 units monthly. Nonetheless, both 16 Taiwanese firms were
 
14 One of the Korean operations is a division in a company that was
 
started up when in 1983 the President of a $13 billion (in sales revenue)

Korean group determined that the time had come for his conglomerate to

establish a presence in the electronics industry. The second was the flagship
 
company of a medium-sized (by Korean standards) group; 
total 1986 group sales

amounted to $160 million. The Taiwanese operation 
was attached to one of that
 
island's three largest conglomerates, which had total 1986 sales of 
$500
 
million (Kuo? accurate?)
 
13 HDDs must be assembled manually by skilled workers in carefully sealed,
 
dust-free clean rooms. As its name implies the HDD is a mechanical device whose
 
function is to locate specific information on the media in response to a signal
from the PC user: one motor -- the spi.ndle motor -- rotates the media at a 
speed of 3,600 rotations per minute; a second motor the-- stepping motor-­
glides the magnetic huad that reads the information rapidly back and forth,
1/10,000 of an inch above the media surface. The high density with which
information 
is stored on media, the very rapid retrieval time, and the neea
for reliable, accurate performance imply that the HDD is a high-precision
mechanism, and thus 
that its assembly is a technology-intensive task.
 
16 For at least one of these firms 
(the earlier entrant), the strategy of
 
in-house design reflected a larger commitment to move to the cutting edge of
technology by taking advantage of Chinese (in the USA as well as 
Taiwan) skills
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pushing ahead with efforts to 
design the next generation HDD, and be in 
a
 
position to 
play a leading role when the market catches up. Production volumes
 
in the large, new factory building of one of the two 
Korean operations (its
 
ties with its erstwhile joint venture 
severed, and production for new orders
 
not yet underway) were all but nonexistent; however, the firm apparently was 
on
 
the brink of announcing an agreement to supply 
a US firm with 8,000 HDDs per
 
month, rising over time to 25,000 monthly. Only the remaining Korean firm gave
 
evidence of substantial activity, with one 
longstanding contract for 5,000 HDDs
 
per month, and a second contract (production of which was starting up at the
 
time of our interview) for a further 10,000 units monthly. The ambition of this
 
last firm was to produce 30,000 HDDs monthly by the end of 1988.17
 
Entry at divergent sizes. The hypothesis of a putative shortfall in Taiwan
 
of firms willing to make 
substantial up-front investments has no power 
to
 
explain variations f.n the performance of Korean and Taiwanese firms in the
 
manufacture of media and precision motors and the
in assembly of HDDs. The
 
hypothesis has 
equally little explanatory power in 
accounting for performance
 
in the supply of keyboards or complete PCs. 
 But whereas for the first three
 
product categories it was the demonstrated ability of Taiwanese firms 
to raise
 
the requisite finance that led us 
to reject the hypothesis, for the remaining
 
two categories, it is the 
ability of Taiwanese firms to 
enter at small-scale
 
and design capabilities.
 
17 At which time HDD revenues were projected to amount to $100 million, 50
 
percent of total projected "evenues for the group. The initial contract was 
for
HDDs of 
a relatively idiosyncratic design, which offered few opportunities for

additional market penetration; the recent
more contract is for HDDs of more

standard design. Along with 
its HDD production, the firm continues supply
to 
5,000 FDDo monthly to the domestic market.
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and expand rapidly thereafter that offsets the 
impact of any shortfall on that
 
island of firms willing to make substantial up-front investments.
 
Korean and Taiwanese suppliers of keyboards and 
of PCs differed radically
 
from one another in their sizes at entry. In 
their initial year of operation
 
the five Taiwanese keyboard and PC suppliers that we interviewed all had fewer
 
than twenty employees, 
and well below $1 million in sales revenues; all five
 
firms were 
begun by young engineers, recently graduated from university, with
 
at most a few years experience in other companies. 
By contrast, the two
 
manufacturers of keyboards in Korea 
(as noted earlier, the dominant and the
 
only other manufacturer of keyboards in the country) were both established on 
a
 
relatively 
large scale as 50:50 joint ventures with Japanese interests; the
 
joint ventures were conduits of Japanese 
switch technology to the burgeoning
 
Korean market for components of manufactured electronics products, with
 
keyboards and keyswitches only two 
lines among many. And both Korean suppliers
 
of PCs were started up expressly as high-volume producers of PCs for the USA
 
market; both firms commenced production with contracts already in hand to ship
 
to the USA 10,000 PCs per month, implying a corresponding gross sales 
revenue
 
for the first year of production in excess of $40 million.
 
The reasons for, and the divergent strategies associated with, these diverse
 
sizes at entry are 
the subject of the companion paper. What is relevant here is
 
that the smaller size at entry of the Taiwanese firms did not result in poorer
 
performance in Taiwan than in Korea. For one thing, none of the five Taiwanese 
firms in our field sample have remained small. Projected 1987 revenues of the 
five firms amounted to $9 million, $20 million, $35 million, $120 million and 
over $200 million. Between 1982 and 1986 
the annual growth rate in sales of the
 
most conservative of the firms ranged between 50 and 100 percent.
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More generally, there is no evidence 
that Taiwanese industry lags behind
 
that of Korea in the supply of either PCs or keyboards. As late as 1983,
 
neither Korea nor Taiwan was a significant exporter of keyboards. Yet, as 
Table
 
3A reveals, as of 1986/7 Taiwan commands four times as much industry capacity,
 
six times the value of exports, 
seven times the number of firms with sales of
 
30,000 or more keyboards monthly, and nine 
times the number of industry
 
participants 
as does Korea. The comparative data on relative performance in the
 
supply of PCs are more 
ambiguous. As is illustrated in Table 3B, 
the value of
 
PC exports from the two zountries in 1986 was 
alniost identical, with Korea's
 
expansion especially rapid after an initial lag. What these data do not reveal,
 
however, is the relative sophistication of the two industries: suppliers of PCs
 
can run the gamut from low-technology 
firms that undertake the relatively
 
simple process of assembling the components that go into a personal computer,
 
to firms with highly qualified R&D teams with the capacity to develop in-house
 
their own circuit designs 
for PCs. One indicator of the sophistication of the
 
PC industry in the two countries is the share 
of 'own-brand' PCs in total
 
exports. 18 At least on the basis of this indicator, the data in Table 3 suggest
 
that it is the Taiwanese industry that is ahead.
 
18 In principle, the best indicator would be data from case studies of
the type sunarized in this study. However, for reasons noted earlier, oursample (evidence from which is described in more detail below) is too small and
biased to permit anything more 
than speculative comparisons. The indicator used
in the text is particularly problematic insofar as the share 
of non-branded

exports is likely 
to be affected by the characteristics of the marketing

networks 
of the two countries 
(an issue that will be analyzed in more depth
later in the paper), as 
well as by the degree to which firms in the two
countries 
have the design competence to market for export their own brand of PCs.
 
Table 3: 	Selected Statistics on the Keyboard and PC Manufacturing
 
industries in Korea and Taiwan
 
Korea 	 Taiwan
 
A: Keyboards
 
Value of 	Exports, 1986 $5-$20 million $70-$90 million
 
Number of Assemblers
 
with sales of 7
 
30,000 or more units
 
monthly (March, 1987)
 
Total Number of 5 44
 
assemblers
 
B: PCs
 
Annual Export Values
 
1983 	 $ 36 million $ 12 million 
1984 	 84 153
 
1985 	 159 240
 
1986 	 404 393
 
Exports of 'own-brand' 16%l/ 28%l/
 
as % total PC exports
 
Number of PC Assemblers 38 	 1192/
 
Sources: 	Republic of China, Institute for the Information Industries,
 
A Comparative Analysis of the Information Industry in Korea
 
and Taiwan (Taipei: May, 1987) (in Chinese); Taiwan Electronic
 
Appliance Manufacturers Association, Annual Directory of
 
Manufacturers 1986/7; Electronic Industries Association of
 
Korea, Annual Directory of the Information Industry 1.987; and
 
data supplied during interviews with association officials
 
and with firms.
 
Notes : 	 1/ The other classes of exports are exports by subsidiaries 
of multinational firms (50 percent of the total in Taiwan,
 
and 40 percent in Korea), and non-branded OEM exports for
 
large foreign buyers.
 
2/ 43 of the 119 firms listed their assets as below $100,000;
 
at least some of these firms are most likely traders
 
rather than assemblers.
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The Fallacy of Gigantism
 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that the larger size of Korean
 
firms has not translated into a clear advantage 
in any of the five products
 
that were the subject of our 
field research. One implication of the research
 
(and also of numerous informal conversations 
as to the availability of venture
 
capital in 
 Taiwan) is that, for investments in potentially profitable
 
technology-intensive activities where up-front costs are 
in the $10 million to
 
$20 million range, access to 
finance does not represent a significant obstacle
 
to entry on 
the part of Taiwanese firms. A second implication, explored in the
 
companion paper, is that 
in sectors that permit variations in the sizes at
 
entry of efficient firms, firms that enter small can nonetheless expand rapidly
 
to become formidable competitors.
 
This is not to say that the 
giant size of the Korean conglomerates confers
 
no advantages. For one thing, this giant size 
 can permit technology-intensive
 
activities across 
a whole variety of components that, taken together, comprise
 
a complete system; however, our 
field research uncovered no evidence of
 
integrated, system-wide efforts at technological development in the personal
 
computer industry in either country. For another thing, Korean Chae'bol might
 
enjoy an over
advantage Taiwanese firms 
 in high-tech activities involving
 
substantially larger investments 19 
 than were required for the products that
 
were the focus of our field research. Thus Mody (1985) bases 
his conclusion
 
that the 
large size of their conglomerates has conferred an advantage for Korea
 
over Taiwan largely on a comparison of the semiconductor industry in the two
 
19 And, of course, for activities that 
though not especially intensive in
 
their technological requirements require major up-front investments of capital
(shipbuilding, for example).
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countries, a sector where the level of production in Korea (1986 sales amounted
 
to $1.4 billion) has pulled far ahead of the level in Taiwan (1986 sales of
 
$610 million).20  Underlying these differences in sales were enormous
 
differences in investment levels: between 1984 and 1986 Korean firms 
invested
 
$1.4 billion, and Taiwanese $300 million;21 as of mid-1987 the leading Korean
 
semiconductor supplier (Samsung Semiconductor and Telecommunications) had
 
itself invested over $500 million in semiconductor facilities. 2 2
 
What our research does suggest is that these advantages of size are not
 
ubiquitous. On the contrary, there are likely to be a whole range of
 
technology-intensive activities to which the 
structure of Taiwanese industry,
 
with its preponderance of dynamic small firms, is exceedingly well-adapted.
 
20 Republic of China, Institute for the Information Industry, A Comparison
 
of the Information Industries of Korea and Taiwan (Taipei: May 1987) p. 25
 
21 Mody (1985) p. 27; the Korean data are projections as of 1984; the
 
Taiwanese figure was 
a 1984 projection for the subsequent threc to five year period.
 
22 It remains to be seen whether Korea's large investment in
 
semiconductors pays off. As of mid-1987 the Koreans 
had consistently lagged
behind the industry leaders, bringing products on stream only once they had 
already become industry standards, their prices already driven down to 
cutthroat levels. At present, the three major Korean semiconductor makers (with
the support of government) are collaborating on development of the next 
generation -- 4M DRA14 -- of semiconductors. For data and further analysis, see
 
"Samsung Semicotductor and Telecommunications: The Worst is Over?" Business
 
Korea, June 1987 pp. 36-38; "W120.5 billion ($150 million) Set Aside for VLSI
 
Chip Development", Korea Trade and Business, May 1986 p. 7; "Semiconductors:
 
What's Shortcircuiting the Industry?" Korea Business World, September 1985, p.
 
16-17; "Chips on the Block" Business Korea, May 1985, pp. 28-30.
 
Bibliography
 
Business Korea, "Samsung Semiconductor and Telecommunications: The Worst is
 
Over?" June 1987 pp. 36-37
 
-"Chips
. - , on the Block" May 1985, pp. 28-30 
Jones, Leroy P. (1980) "Jae-bul and the Concentration of Economic
 
Power in Korean Development: Issues, Evidence and Alternatives", Korea
 
Development Institute Working Paper
 
Korea Business World, "Semiconductors: What's Shortcircuiting the
 
Industry?" September, 1985, pp. 16-17
 
Korea Trade and Business, "W120.5 billion Set Aside for VLSI Chip
 
Development", May 1986, p. 7
 
Lee, Kyu-uck, (1986) "The Concentration of Economic Power in Korea: Causes,
 
Consequences and Policy", 
 in Kyu-uck Lee (ed.) Industrial Development
 
Policies and Issues (Seoul: Korea Development Institute)
 
Levy, Brian and Wen-Jeng Kuo (1987) "The Strategic Orientations of Firms and
 
the Performance of and in Frontier Industries: from
Korea Taiwan Lessons 

Comparative Case Studies of Keyboard and Personal Computer Assembly", 
Korea
 
Development Institute, EEPA and Williams College Working Papers
 
Mody, Ashoka (1986) "Recent Evolution of Microelectronics in Korea and Taiwan:
 
An Institutional Approach 
to Comparative Advantage" Boston University,
 
Center for Asian Development Studies, Discussion Paper Number 36, May
 
Republic of China, Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and
 
Statistics, Executive Yuan, The Report on the industrial and
 
Commercial Census, Taiwan-Fukien Area., 1981
 
....- , Institute for Information Industries, A Comparative Analysis of t,.
 
Information Industry in Korea and Taiwan (Taipei, May 1985)
 
Republic of Korea, Economic Planning Board, Mining and Manufacturing Survey,
 
1981
 
EEPA PROJECT DISCUSSION PAPERS
 
1. "The Effect of Policy and Policy Reforms on Non-Agricultural
 
Enterprises and Employment in Developing ountries: A Review of
 
Past Experiences", Steve Haggblade, Carl Liedholm, and Donald
 
Mead; March, 1986.
 
2. "on Measuring Relative Efficiency In a Size Distribution of
 
Firms", Tyler Biggs; May, 1986.
 
3. "The Question of Political Feasibility: Approaches to the
 
Study of Policy Space", Merilee Grindle; March, 1986.
 
4. "Location Theory and the Size Distribution of Firms", Jeremy
 
Oppenheim; March, 1986.
 
5. "Economy-wide Models for Analyzing Policy Reform", Jeremy
 
Oppenheim; April, 1986.
 
6. "What Drives the Size Distribution of Firms in Developig
 
Countries?", Tyler Biggs, Jeremy Oppenheim; November, 1986.
 
8. "Prospects and Perils for Small and Medium Enterprises in
 
Outward-oriented Industrial Expansion: Lessons from Korea and
 
Taiwan", Brian Levy; November, 1986.
 
9. "Lewis Through a Looking Glass: Public Sector Employment,
 
Rent-Seeking and Economic Growth", A. Gelb, J.B. Knight, R. H.
 
Sabot; January, 1987.
 
10. "The Political Economy of Policy Change in Developing
 
Countries", Merilee S. Grindle, John W. Thomas; October, 1987.
 
11. "Investment Requirements and the Participation of Korean and
 
Taiwanese Firms in Technology-Intensive Industries", Brian Levy,
 
Wen-jeng Kuo; October, 1987.
 
12. "The Strategic Orientations of Firms and the Performance of
 
Korea and Taiwan in Frontier Industries: Lessons from
 
Comparative Case Studies of Keyboard and Personal Computer
 
Assembly", Brian Levy, Wen-jeng Kuo; October, 1987.
 
13. "Export Intermediation and the Structure of Industry in Korea
 
and Taiwan", Brian Levy; October, 1987. 
